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Notwithstanding these difficulties regarding ultimate questions, one must acknowledge heartily the importance of Professor Baldwin's contribution in a comparatively new field. The form of the book is at first somewhat repelling. It presents on first reading a multitude of divisions and distinctions in a terminology that is largely unfamiliar, but these difficulties largely disappear on further acquaintance. It still appears to me, indeed, that some of the author's distinctions are not of vital importance, and that he has an undue fondness for his own terminology. But the comparatively new field which he is exploring, together with the value of his results, would excuse more serious defects than these. And after all one might pass the same criticism on Kant's *Kritik* or on Hegel's *Logic*.

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The Persistent Problems of Philosophy: An Introduction to Metaphysics through the Study of Modern Systems. By MARY WHITON CALKINS. New York, The Macmillan Company; London, Macmillan and Co., 1907. — pp. xxii, 575.

The book before us is described in the Preface as an attempt "to combine" what seem to the author "the essential features of a systematic Introduction to Metaphysics with those of a History of Modern Philosophy." It is intended for the use, not only of beginners in philosophy, but also of more advanced students.

The introductory chapter seeks to define the nature of philosophy and to distinguish its various types. "Philosophy is the attempt to discover by reasoning the utterly irreducible nature of anything; and philosophy, in its most adequate form, seeks the ultimate nature of all-that-there-is" (pp. 5 f.). From the point of view of this definition, various types of philosophical systems are distinguished. The ultimate nature of reality may be considered from a quantitative and from a qualitative point of view. Quantitatively speaking, systems of philosophy are numerically monistic and numerically pluralistic. But the terms 'monism' and 'pluralism' may also be applied qualitatively, according as we regard the universe (whether it be one or many beings) to be "all of a kind" or to have a plural nature. Thus we get the distinction between qualitatively monistic and qualitatively pluralistic systems. Again, qualitatively monistic systems may be either idealistic or non-idealistic. And, finally, idealistic systems may be phenomenalistic, those which "regard consciousness as mere succession of ideas," and spiritualistic or personalistic, those which mean by 'consciousness' a conscious self or selves (pp. 9 f.).

On the basis of this classification, Professor Calkins proceeds to discuss the representative modern philosophers from Descartes to Hegel. Save for a brief reference in the chapter on Berkeley, Locke's system is omitted, on the ground that it is essentially that of Descartes (p. 111). The numerical pluralists are taken up first. Among them, Descartes stands as the chief representative of qualitative pluralism. The qualitative monists of the group are: (1) Hobbes, whose monism is non-idealistic; and (2) Leibniz, Berkeley, and Hume, whose monism is idealistic. Of these latter, Leibniz and Berkeley are, further, personalists, while Hume is a phenomenalist. With Hume the discussion of numerical pluralism ends. Then follows a chapter on Kant, whom the author is unable to fit into her classification, because his system, "as internally inconsistent," fails "to represent any one type of philosophy" (p. 10, note). After Kant, the numerical monists are considered. The philosopher who combines qualitative pluralism with quantitative monism is Spinoza. The qualitative monists in the group, namely, Schopenhauer and Hegel, are not only idealists, but spiritualists as well. Fichte and Schelling, whose systems, like that of Kant, are characterized as "internally inconsistent," are discussed after Spinoza on the ground that, while they are not consistent, they nevertheless represent in a general way the advance toward monistic spiritualism. The concluding chapter of the book discusses contemporary systems, both idealistic and non-idealistic. The Appendix, embracing somewhat more than one hundred pages, contains biographies and bibliographies of writers discussed or referred to in the body of the work, critical notes, and expositions of parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and of Spinoza's *Ethics*.

The only important departure from the chronological order which the mode of treatment followed in the body of the work involves, is in the case of Spinoza. Aside from the greater convenience of discussing his system in connection with the other forms of numerical monism, the author would urge, I infer, that Spinoza may properly be considered between Kant and Fichte because his philosophy had little influence upon the history of thought until the latter part of the eighteenth century. In the interests of young students, however, it would have been well to point out, in the earlier part of the book, that Spinoza is taken out of the chronological order. His chronological position is, of course, indicated when we come to the discussion of his system (p. 278); but until this point the student is left to think that numerical monism had no representative in the seventeenth century.

The discussion of the various modern systems which constitutes the

main part of the book is naturally limited by the plan of the work. The author does not attempt to give a complete account of these systems, but considers each chiefly from the point of view of the questions which she has proposed as the basis of her classification. In this connection it might, perhaps, be urged that the title of the book is a little unfortunate, since it leads us to expect the discussion of some problems which are not taken up. But there can be no question that, in giving us this vigorous and detailed treatment of a few specific questions, Professor Calkins has rendered a higher service than she could have done by taking up a larger number of problems and studying them less exhaustively. Besides this, it should be noted that the Appendix supplies some deficiencies, and that in some other cases most of the important doctrines of the philosopher under consideration are at least touched upon in connection with the investigation of those problems which have been chosen as fundamental.

Professor Calkins's discussions of the philosophers whom she has selected for study are of great value. In each case, we have a careful exposition of the doctrine under consideration, followed or accompanied by a detailed and searching criticism. The expositions are, almost without exception, admirable for clearness and system. Even when one dissents, as one sometimes must, from the author's interpretation, one cannot fail to recognize the coherent thought and the power of clear expression which give to her exposition its unusual directness and lucidity. The criticisms, which form a considerable part of each chapter, are detailed, systematic, and penetrating, and are put with much clearness. As the author indicates in her Preface, they are made from the point of view of her own metaphysical theory, the doctrine that ultimate reality is an Absolute Self. But this is inevitable, and not, in my judgment, undesirable. An objection that may perhaps more properly be raised to some of Professor Calkins's criticisms is that her own love of system and clearness occasionally leads her into an error of emphasis, the error of demanding of a philosopher that he give us reasoned arguments for all his insights. Spinoza "never proves" that the All is One; Fichte "assumes, and does not argue, that the all-including One is activity" (p. 321, note); and even Hegel "nowhere explicitly outlines the argument" for his "doctrine that ultimate reality is an Individual," an oversight which Professor Calkins characterizes as "the greatest and the most inexplicable defect of Hegel's 'Logic'" (p. 380). I do not mean, of course, to imply that we have no right to demand argument of philosophy. I mean simply that there is here, perhaps, a little too much of the

balancing of arguments and not quite enough of the reproducing of the spirit of a system. But while, in a general way, this criticism may be made, I would not lay too much stress upon it. In a work which professed to be a history of philosophy, the defect, even in the slight degree in which it exists in this book, would be more serious. But Professor Calkins's main purpose is to determine what conceptions of ultimate reality the various philosophers have, and how far they have succeeded in establishing the validity of these conceptions. Hence the estimation of set arguments is a necessary part of her task, whereas she is not so much concerned to determine the value of each system as a whole.

A detailed discussion of all the chapters in this interesting book would require more space than we have at our command; but some of the salient points may be considered. The chapter on Leibniz gives, on the whole, an admirable exposition of a system which it is by no means easy to present to students in a way that will win their sympathy and intelligent appreciation. The argument for Leibniz's general idealistic position is put with great clearness. The weak point in the exposition as a whole seems to me to be the treatment of the doctrine of preëstablished harmony. The relation between the preëstablished harmony that prevails throughout the universe of monads and the special case of the harmony of mind and body is nowhere explained, and the passage from the one to the other (p. 89) is somewhat confusing, the more so as the explanation of what Leibniz means by an animal body first appears several pages later.

The detailed exposition of Berkeley is excellent. The only point that I am disposed to criticise is the treatment of Berkeley's doctrine of the self, which will be touched upon later. The chapter on Hume gives an interpretation from which many will dissent. In the first place, it is bearing rather hard upon a thinker of Hume's tendencies to try to fit him into a scheme of constructive metaphysics. Professor Calkins admits that Hume is "skeptic" rather than "constructive philosopher," and that his "teaching is, above all, negative"; but she maintains that, through his critical objections to accepted theories, he "really formulated a new doctrine" (p. 150). To a certain extent this may be granted; but when one reads, *e. g.*, that "Hume teaches that reality is through and through immaterial," and that "he believes the universe to consist of a great complex of ever shifting sensations and images" (p. 149), one is hardly able to give full assent. Professor Calkins's discussion of Hume's doctrine of causality is one of the important features of the chapter. In the so-called

'causal connection of events,' she distinguishes two kinds of necessity: (1) the necessary "connection between cause and effect regarded merely as events in time," which is "formulated in the proposition, 'Every past has a present and has a future,' " and (2) the strictly causal necessity, "expressed in the proposition, 'Every recurring event . . . is uniformly followed by the same event' " (p. 155). In none of Hume's three arguments against causality does he succeed in disproving the necessity of the temporal connection. But Professor Calkins maintains that he does disprove the necessity of the strictly causal connection, by his argument that experience can tell us only "what *has* happened, not what *will* happen. In the first place, "exactly the same event never recurs"; and, in the second place, "to-day's event, though precisely similar to yesterday's, cannot be known to have an event precisely similar to yesterday's as its consequent. . . . It is, to be sure, contrary to observation and subversive of science to suppose a cause repeated without repetition of the effect, but such a supposition is not logically impossible" (p. 162). I am not quite able to understand Professor Calkins's point of view here. If the denial of causal necessity is really subversive of science, philosophy can hardly afford to ignore that fact. But perhaps the author does not mean quite what she seems here to imply; for, in her later discussion of Kant's doctrine of causality, she seems to teach that science is possible without the supposition of causal necessity.

The chapter on Kant is at the same time one of the most valuable and interesting in the book and one of those most open to criticism. The interpretation is certainly one-sided; notably, the epistemological significance of Kant's work is too lightly touched upon, and, one suspects, too lightly valued. But the interpretation is suggestive and bears the marks of acute and independent thinking. In regard to causality, Professor Calkins believes that Kant succeeds in showing, in opposition to Hume, the necessity of the temporal connection of events, but that he fails to prove that the causal or uniform connection of events is absolutely necessary. Kant argues that we could not "know the world as a connected whole of regularly recurring phenomena, if the causal uniformity were not absolutely universal." Professor Calkins maintains that, while the assumption of the regularity of nature is necessary to scientific investigation, all that is really needed as a basis for this assumption is "an ordinarily uniform," rather than "an inevitably uniform experience" (p. 216).

The section in which the author criticises Kant's doctrine of the necessity of the categories (pp. 220 ff.) is one of the few passages in

the book which lack the lucidity that is a notable characteristic of the work as a whole. In the interests of clearness, I think it would be better to avoid interchanging the terms 'universality' and 'necessity.' The further identification of *a priori* with 'universal' (or 'necessary') and of *a posteriori* with 'individual' (or 'contingent') seems also unfortunate. If the student's knowledge of Kant were to be confined to Professor Calkins's book, this identification would probably cause little trouble; but it is liable to be somewhat confusing to a beginner who is struggling with the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself. The substance of the section is, briefly, that Kant is wrong in maintaining that space, time, and the categories have any other necessity than that which sensations have. All analytical judgments, — even judgments about sensations, — have logical necessity. And this is the only kind of necessity to which the categories can lay claim. Synthetic judgments are never necessary. Kant asserts, but never proves, that there are necessary judgments in mathematics which are synthetic. Professor Calkins follows Couturat in maintaining that these judgments are really analytic. The only case in which Kant tries to prove that there are necessary synthetic judgments is that of causality. And here "he is unsuccessful. For the truth is, as Hume saw clearly, that the causal principle loses necessity whenever it becomes synthetic — whenever . . . it seeks to prophesy uniformity, though it has experienced only customary conjunction" (p. 225). However the case may be with mathematics, I am unable to accept the argument involved in Professor Calkins's attack upon Kant's doctrine of causality. As the human mind is constituted, it seems impossible for us to believe that any given event is uncaused. And Hume has shown that, when we assert of an event that it must have had some cause, we are not making an analytical judgment. On the whole, I incline to think that Professor Calkins's objection to asserting the *epistemological* necessity of the causal relation is grounded upon her failure to distinguish between causal necessity and what Rickert calls 'Gesetzmässigkeit,' the absolute uniformity which is expressed in a 'law of nature.' Every event is something individual, unique; as Professor Calkins rightly says, precisely the same event never recurs. Hence, we are not justified in asserting causal uniformity in the sense of declaring that the future of the world, or of any part of it, will be precisely like the present. But every event has, nevertheless, its cause, and could not have been different from what it is unless that cause had been different. If we choose, we may, perhaps, express this by saying that, *if* precisely the same cause could recur, the same effect would ensue. But the expres-

sion is unfortunate, as involving the supposition of what we admit to be impossible.

Kant's doctrine of the self is also subjected to criticism. Hume's conception of consciousness as mere succession of ideas, rather than conscious self, created the demand for a new vindication of the doctrine of the self. Kant furnished this by showing that ideas and their relatedness "imply the existence of an identical and unifying self" (p. 228). But the only self that we can know is, according to him, the empirical self, and this reduces "to an ego closely resembling Hume's mere bundle of perceptions" (pp. 242 f.). In opposition to Kant, Professor Calkins brings forward arguments to show that the "real self" is knowable. In this connection a criticism suggests itself which might have been made at various other points in the book, namely, that Professor Calkins nowhere gives us so full a discussion of her own conception of the self as seems to be demanded. To be specific, one wishes that she had more fully defined her position with reference to the old doctrine of the substantial self, to which Hume and Kant gave the death-blow. That a satisfactory conception must occupy some intermediate position between that of Hume, on the one hand, and that of Descartes, Wolff, and Berkeley, on the other, seems to me evident. Professor Calkins indicates her dissent from Hume's teaching, but she does not make it quite clear how her conception stands related to the traditional doctrine of the substantial self. In this connection one might suggest that she lays herself open to the charge of teaching a dualism of the Berkeleian type. The naïve idealism of Berkeley explicitly posits two sorts of reality: 'idea' or state of consciousness, which is wholly passive, and the active spirit, "a thing entirely distinct from ideas." I do not mean to suggest that Professor Calkins really holds this naïve conception of the self. But, in view of the sharpness of her dissent from the Humian doctrine, it is incumbent upon her, I think, to show us more clearly than she does in what relation she stands to Berkeley's position. Her discussion of Berkeley would, in itself, suggest that she accepts his doctrine without qualification. And, in like manner, the way in which she deals with Kant's discussion of the 'paralogisms' seems to imply that she finds in it no valid criticism of the conception of the substantial self. Nor can it be justly urged, I think, that the treatment of the self in her *Introduction to Psychology* absolves the author from the task which we have indicated. In the first place, I do not understand that the present book takes for granted that all its readers are familiar with the *Introduction*. And, in the second place, I have myself not found it easy to learn,

from Professor Calkins's psychological writings, precisely what her doctrine of the self is, — just how it differs, *e. g.*, from that of Descartes and Berkeley.

The discussion of Spinoza seems to me less sympathetic than most of the other chapters. The doctrine of the attributes is criticised as being "inconsistent with the teaching that God is fundamentally one." For each of the attributes, according to Spinoza, constitutes the essence of substance, "and surely that which has many essentialities, or natures, cannot be truly one" (p. 294). The same objection is involved in the author's criticism of Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism. In both criticisms, it seems to me, Professor Calkins takes somewhat too literally Spinoza's insistence upon the distinctness of the attributes. What he is concerned to show is that the universe is not to be regarded as made up of thinking beings *plus* extended beings, but that each existing thing, — and, of course, the One of which each individual thing is a part, — is both thinking and extended. A thought-mode cannot be causally related to an extension-mode, because the two are, at bottom, one. Professor Calkins, of course, denies that they can be one, on the ground that the difference between the attributes is ultimate. But this is to emphasize the letter, rather than the spirit, of Spinoza's teaching. The only way, it seems to me, in which one can legitimately attack Spinoza's position is to insist upon the idealistic considerations which compel us to revise the naïve conception of the nature of extension. Professor Calkins mentions these idealistic considerations; but it would have been better if she had made them more prominent, and had laid less stress upon the other, and more doubtful, argument.

The discussion of Fichte is based chiefly upon the *Vocation of Man* and the *Foundation of the Whole Science of Knowledge*. The author interprets Fichte as teaching that reality is an all-inclusive Self, which is spiritual and yet impersonal. To this she objects that this "Absolute is not in any sense a self. . . . There is no such thing as impersonal consciousness" (p. 328). Moreover, Fichte's only reason for asserting that the absolute Self is impersonal is that personality, as he believes, involves limitations, and that he "cannot conceive of the ultimate reality as limited." The Absolute is truly conceived, however, "not as unlimited, but as 'self-limited,'" and "with this admission, the impossibility of a personal Absolute vanishes" (p. 330). This criticism seems to indicate that Professor Calkins rather underestimates the difficulty of conceiving the nature of an all-embracing consciousness. If the finite spirits are united in the Infinite Spirit in

somewhat the sense in which my own separate thoughts are united in my individual consciousness, it is hard to understand why these finite spirits are not aware of their oneness. It may be that, in spite of all its apparent defects, the conception of the Absolute Spirit gives us the most satisfactory explanation of experience which we can hope to find; but I think that most of those who adopt it fail to admit, or perhaps to recognize, the great difficulties inherent in it. It seems to me that Professor Calkins does not recognize fully the source of the difficulty which Fichte finds. What he is trying to do is to keep close to the facts of human life, and, in particular, to do justice to those aspects of experience which make many a serious thinker an out-and-out pluralist. He is continually teaching that actuality is not unitary, either qualitatively or quantitatively speaking. The unity of "all individuals" in the "pure Spirit" and the unity of subject and object in the perfected knowledge and the perfected moral life are an ideal, to which the world can only approximate. Thus, in one sense, we may say that reality *is* not, but is only *becoming*, one. In another sense, however, Fichte seems to teach that it is even now one, — one reality, which is conscious of itself only as many individuals (quantitative pluralism) and as subject opposed to object (qualitative pluralism), but in which consciousness is gradually developing toward unity. That this conception is free from objection, I am not prepared to say; but, at any rate, we should recognize that Fichte is led to it through his refusal to ignore certain obvious aspects of experience.

Following upon the discussion of Fichte, we have a brief consideration of the doctrines of Schelling and Schopenhauer. The author's treatment of Schopenhauer is somewhat peculiar, particularly in the subordinate place which is assigned to his pessimism. "The common estimate" of Schopenhauer "as mere prophet of pessimism is both unfortunate and unjust. Brilliant and appealing as his pessimism is, it is after all only an offshoot from his metaphysical doctrine, and is not to be compared, in strength of argument or in keenness of analysis, with the idealistic philosophy on which it is based" (pp. 356 f.). "His great advance upon Fichte and Schelling consists in his implicit recognition of the personality of the absolute self." But "he falls short of an idealistic monism," because "he inadequately conceives this personality, . . . and because he fails to demonstrate its absoluteness" (p. 343).

In accord with the general purpose of the book, the discussion of Hegel is confined to a consideration of his fundamental metaphysical doctrines, with only brief reference to his philosophy of history and

philosophy of religion. Hegel's great achievement is his convincing argument for the doctrine that ultimate reality is an Absolute Self. This argument Professor Calkins presents with great clearness and force, and in considerable detail. Her exposition, as she points out, diverges "widely from Hegel's own order of thought" (p. 361, note), even involving a change in the order of the categories. But she holds, and I think rightly, that the gain in clearness justifies this procedure. The exposition is admirable for its directness and lucidity, and, as might be expected, is very sympathetic.

The concluding chapter is devoted to an examination of contemporary philosophical systems, with special reference to the issue between pluralistic and monistic personalism. The greater part of it is an exposition and defence of monistic personalism, and presents a theory closely akin to that of Professor Royce, whose influence upon her thought the author readily acknowledges.

Professor Calkins deserves the thanks of students and teachers of philosophy for the admirable piece of work which she has done. From first to last the book is fresh and suggestive, clear in statement, vigorous and penetrating in criticism. However much one may dissent from certain of the positions taken, the value of the book as a whole is unquestionable.

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L'évolution créatrice. Par HENRI BERGSON. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1907. — pp. viii, 399.

To readers of Bergson it is scarcely necessary to state that the general position adopted in this book is a form of voluntarism. In attitude the work is thoroughly empirical; while, on the side of content, its most prominent feature is its doctrine of time, which in the last analysis determines the position to be taken with regard to all important problems. As opposed to 'apriorism' and to all philosophies which maintain that the whole of reality can be summed up into some sort of unity and viewed *sub specie æternitatis*, it is maintained that duration is a basal character of reality, and that the cosmic process is thus continuously creative, in that at each moment it produces something which is necessarily new and unpredictable to any intelligence whatsoever.

The first chapter, entitled "Mechanism and Finality," opens with an exposition of this conception of time. As psychological analysis has sufficiently shown, the element of change is pervasive of our whole